1984 S.C. Op. Atty. Gen. 332 (S.C.A.G.), 1984 S.C. Op. Atty. Gen. No. 84-137, 1984 WL 159943

Office of the Attorney General

State of South Carolina Opinion No. 84-137 November 30, 1984

*1 Re: Retroactivity of Marchant v. Hamilton

Major General T. Eston Marchant, SCARNG Adjutant General Rembert C. Dennis Office Building 1000 Assembly Street Columbia, South Carolina 29201

Dear Eston:

You have requested this office's opinion on the following questions:

- 1. Whether the decision in Marchant v. Hamilton, 309 S.E.2d 781 (S.C. App. 1983) is to be applied retroactively?
- 2. What statute of limitations, if any, would apply to claims for back pay?
- 3. Whether <u>Marchant v. Hamilton</u> decided the issue of whether public employees who used their annual leave during military training in order to receive their full pay, because their employer would not pay full pay for military training, were entitled to restoration of their leave?

The Court's ruling in <u>Marchant</u> construed a statute which had been the law in this State since 1950. The decision did not overrule any precedent or make new law. Therefore, the opinion would be applied retroactively as well as prospectively. <u>State v. Southern Farm Bureau Life Ins. Co.</u>, 265 S.C. 402, 219 S.E.2d 80 (1975).

It would appear that in most situations the applicable statute of limitations would be Section 15–3–530(2), South Carolina Code of Laws (1976), which provides for a six year limitation period for an action upon a liability created by statute other than a penalty. However, your attention is directed to Section 15–3–560 of the Code which provides for a one year limitation period for an action against a county with a population in excess of eighty-five thousand brought by an employee on any, claim for salary or wage alleged to be due. This provision may be applicable to a Guardman's claim against a county employer. Of course, the applicability of any statute of limitations would, in the final analysis, have to be made on a case-by-case basis since there are various equitable doctrines (waiver, estoppel, tolling, etc.) which may be asserted.

Finally, the Court of Appeals' decision in <u>Marchant</u> only addressed the issue of 'loss of pay;' the Court did not specifically address or even discuss restoration of leave when such leave was taken in order to receive full pay.

If I can be of further assistance to you in this matter, please do not hesitate to contact me. With kindest personal regards, I am Very truly yours,

T. Travis Medlock Attorney General

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